conceptualizes their relationship as opposing fields of law with colliding policy interests as well as contradictory rules and regulations, 5 other argues that a human rights dimension can be recognized in international investment law. 6 In any case, the relationship between international investment and human rights represents a troublesome matter to the States, who must balance the compliance with their international obligations under human rights instruments, with the protection of the interest of the investors guaranteed by IIAs. In a fragmented international legal order, commitments to protect foreign investment can potentially interfere with the duty of the States to fulfill their obligations under human rights instruments. Moreover, it is claimed that international investment law may trigger a 'regulatory chill' for national legislation, 7 particularly with respect to human rights. The experience of Latin America can be useful to exemplify this dilemma for States, considering that is on the one hand, the region with more ISDS cases in the world, and on the other hand, a region with a dedicated court sytem for the protection of human rights. For that reason, this paper examines disputes that have been brought in parallel to both human rights an investment arbitration tribunals against Peru and Ecuador, analysing if the outcomes in both cases share certain legal principles, or are in contradiction by nature, and the consequent impacts on the State's autonomy to develop a regulatory framework that protects both human rights and foreign investors. In order to provide a comparative perspective, parallel cases brought against Russia both before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and several investment arbitral tribunals will be briefly addressed.
The content of this paper is structured as follows: Section II illustrates the changing attitude of some countries of the region towards foreign investment and human rights. Section III studies the interaction between the investment and human rights cases against Peru, with a special emphasis into the impacts on the State's position on both cases, while Section IV applies the same focus to the cases against Ecuador. Section V deals with the comparative analysis with the ECtHR, and finally, Section VI presents the conclusions on the relationship between foreign investment and human rights dispute settlement in Latin America.
II. Foreign Investment and human rights in Latin America: a shifting sailboat
In 1971, the Uruguayan novelist Eduardo Galeano described Latin America as "the region of open veins", in the light of the historically controversial relationship between the LatinAmerican countries and foreign powers, especially the United States of America (US) and
Europe. Galeano depicted a negative interpretation of the impact of free trade and foreign investment on the region by stating that "everything, from the discovery until our times, has always been transmuted into European-or later United States-capital, and as such has accumulated in distant centers of power". 9 There is ample evidence of the stormy connection between Latin American countries and foreign companies, since the arrival of the European colonialism in the late 15 th century to these days. Yet, the position of the Latin American governments has been wavering from a complete support to the foreign investors to an intransigent opposition to its participation on their economies, characterized by several events of discrepancy and contradiction. In the next section we will examine some of the few cases that have been brought in parallel against countries of the region (Peru and Ecuador), on both human rights and investment international tribunals.
III. La Oroya and Renco cases against Peru

A. La Oroya complex
Mining industry has become one of the important drivers of economic growth in Peruvian economy. However, the development of the mining in Peru has had many health and environmental costs for the communities where this activity is taking place. In 2012, a series of demonstrations in the cities of Cajamarca, Espinar, and La Oroya arouse national attention due to the violent response of the local authorities against civil society organizations protesting against harmful actions of the mining companies. 25 La Oroya is a city of over 33,000 inhabitants, located in the central The Peruvian State addressed these allegations by describing all the relevant activities and investments that Centromin conducted to enhance its environmental performance and to mitigate any potential impact on the health of the citizens of La Oroya, claiming fully compliance with the PAMA, and highlighting the State's health service agencies implementation of a comprehensive strategy to face the problems arising from the toxic emissions. Moreover, the State declared that "after the verdict of the Constitutional Court, DIGESA conducted a full diagnosis, which included an inventory of the complex's emissions, the monitoring of the air quality close to the site, and epidemiologic studies that serves as the foundations of the Plan to Improve the Air Quality for the Atmospheric Basin of La Oroya". 42 Despite the efforts of the Peruvian State to prove its diligence to act and protect the environment and the health of the citizens of La Oroya, the IACHR ruled that "the facts described by both parties could be declared as a violation of the ACHR [American Convention on Human Rights]", 43 and on 5 August 2009, declared the complaint admissible.
Petitioners are now waiting for the final report on the merits from the Commission, a process that has been severely delayed, due to the fact that the IACHR has been affected by years of budget restrictions due to the lack of enough funding from the States. accordance with international standards; and to provide information on the actions adopted to investigate the facts in order to avoid repetition. 45 In this IACHR decision and in the one that declared the complaint admissible there is a no mention of the existence of investment disputes between Doe Run and Peru, neither under Peruvian and US Courts, nor under ISDS, as it will be explained in the following section.
D. The ISDS case against Peru
On April 2011, the Renco Group, Inc., on its own behalf and of its affiliate DRP, submitted a Renco Group claimed no less than 800 million USD in damages alleging that it has been victim of unfair and inequitable treatment and that the government of Peru has failed to afford them full protection and security and national treatment, and to observe any obligations into which it entered. The company also asked for a declaration that Renco and DRP have no responsibility or liability for any damages that the plaintiffs in the lawsuits filed against them in the US, or any similar lawsuit, and that Peru is required to appear in and defend those lawsuits and to assume responsibility and liability for any damages that may be recovered.
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On 15 July 2016, the ISDS arbitral tribunal dismissed Renco's claims based on lack of jurisdiction, declaring that Renco failed to comply with formals requirement of the US-Peru TPA, and therefore the case was decided in favor of the Republic of Peru.
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Possibly because this decision is not about the merits of the dispute, the Renco award on jurisdiction does not acknowledges La Oroya case before the IACHR. Interestingly, the decision includes comments on human rights case law of the ECtHR while pondering on the application of the principle of severability of an arbitration agreement from the main contract in which such an agreement is contained. However, the arbitral tribunal finally did not rule on this issue, after concluding that no arbitration agreement ever came into existence as a result of Renco's non-compliance with the US-Peru TPA.
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As we can see, although a group of parallel cases against Peru have been initiated under the same set of facts -the harmful effects of La Oroya complex -before a human rights regional system (IACHR) and an ISDS arbitral tribunal, there is virtually no relationship between the human rights and the investment cases pending at international fora. In contrast, the domestic litigation against Doe Run in US Courts proved to be not only aware of the ISDS case, but its mere existence affected substantially the applicable jurisdiction and the overall procedure, as in 2011, Doe Run successfully removed the cases from the Missouri State Court to the federal level, based the fact that were related to a pending arbitration between the company and the Peruvian State.
IV. The Chevron/Texaco and the Kichwa Peoples of the Sarayaku Community cases against Ecuador
A. Texaco oil operations and Ecuadorian indigenous communities
In 1964 Ecuador signed a contract with Texaco Petroleum Company (TexPet), an affiliate of the American company Texaco, to exploit oil fields in the Northeastern region of the country.
TexPet entered into a joint-venture with the Ecuadorian state-owned company, PetroEcuador, which was the majority shareholder, while TexPet was the deemed the "operator" of the entity and was authorized to design, procure, install, manage, and operate the infrastructure for the operation. 52 The company began full-scale production in 1973 in almost a nonexistent regulation of the social and environmental effects of the oil extraction. However, the 1971 Ecuador's Law of
Hydrocarbons did require field operators to "adopt necessary measures to protect flora, fauna and other natural resources" and "prevent contamination of water, air, and soil". 53 During more than two decades of drilling in Ecuador, TexPet ran a profitable business drilling 339 wells and built 18 central production stations in over a million-acre concession and extracted approximately 1.4 billion barrels of crude oil. 55 As counterpart of this, the oil extraction had a disastrous outcome for the water and the biodiversity of the region.
The main sources of environmental damage from TexPet operations were the leakage or discharge of contaminated water and drilling wastes held in unlined pits, the accidental discharge from the trans-Ecuadorian pipeline and subsidiary pipelines operated by Texaco;
and, the deliberate dumping and spraying of oil and drilling wastes. 56 Additionally, the operations of the company intervened ecosystems and the ancestral land of several tribes and indigenous population from the Amazonian region of Ecuador. 57 
B. Litigation before US and Ecuadorian courts
In November 1993, a group of claimants representing more than 30,000 people from eighty communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon, including five indigenous nationalities: Siona, In an attempt for prevent the consequences of the lawsuit that would be filed before the Chevron "shameless scoundrels who knew they had contaminated, but with their millions wanted to go unpunished". 67 Texaco alleged for the politicization of the case and the biased behaviour at the Ecuadorian courts. 68 After a seven-year trial, the Court of Nueva Loja found
Texaco-Chevron liable for pollution caused and issued a US$ 8.6 billion judgement against the company, plus 10% compensation to the plaintiffs, which would be increased to US$19 billion if Texaco-Chevron did not promptly issue a public apology to the communities. 69 The decision was ratified by a court of appeals and later, in November 2013, the National Court of
Justice of Ecuador affirmed the judgement, but reversed awarding punitive damages and reduced the total amount of the judgement against Texaco-Chevron to a total of US$9.5 billion.
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After the publication of the final decision of the Aguinda case in Ecuador, the focus of the discussion between the plaintiffs and Chevron turned into the enforceability of the award before the US courts. From early on, some analysts had concluded that the verdict of the Ecuadorian Courts was probably unenforceable outside Ecuador given the lack of local assets of the company. 71 Moreover, already in 2011, Chevron initiated a strategy to delay any kind of enforcement of the award and even filed a lawsuit against the lawyers that represented the victims in the case before the Ecuadorian courts. Ecuador was responsible for a series of acts and omissions harming the Kichwa because it had allowed an oil company to carry out activities on the ancestral lands of the Sarayaku community without its consent, persecuted community leaders, and denied judicial protection and legal due process. Moreover, the petitioners argued that the State allowed third parties to systematically violate the rights of the Sarayaku community.
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On 26 July 1996, the State Oil Company of Ecuador PetroEcuador and the consortium formed by two companies related to Chevron, 77 signed a partnership contract for hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation of crude oil in the Amazonian Region. 78 The territory granted for that purpose in the contract covered an area of 200,000 hectares, inhabited by several indigenous associations, communities and peoples. Sarayaku is the largest of these indigenous settlements in terms of population and land area, since its ancestral and legal territory accounted for around 65% of the territory included in the contract.
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The petitioners alleged that by virtue of such contract, the State was responsible for violating the fundamental individual and collective rights of the Sarayaku community and its members protected by the ACHR, specifically the right to life, property, judicial protection, due process, freedom of movement, personal integrity, personal liberty and security, freedom of association, political participation, freedom of expression, juridical personality, freedom of conscience and religion, rights of the child, equality, health and culture.
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After four years of proceeding, on 25 July 2012 the IACtHR declared that Ecuador was responsible for the violation of the rights to consultation, to indigenous communal property, and to cultural identity, and that it was responsible for severely jeopardizing the rights to life and to personal integrity, in relation to the obligation to guarantee the right to communal property. The decision also ruled that Ecuador was responsible for the violation of the right to judicial guarantees and to judicial protection, to the detriment of the Kichwa Indigenous
People of Sarayaku.
81
The IACtHR also ordered Ecuador to adopt the necessary legislative, administrative or any other type of measures to give full effect, within a reasonable time, to the right to prior consultation of the indigenous and tribal peoples and communities and to amend those that prevent its free and full exercise. For that purpose, the Ecuadorian government should consult the Sarayaku People in a prior, adequate and effective manner, and in full compliance with the relevant international standards applicable, in the event that it seeks to carry out any activity or project for the extraction of natural resources on its territory, or any investment or Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers. 90 The ACHR is cited by the claimants as guaranteeing the right to a hearing in a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal for the determination of rights and obligations of a civil or any other nature. 91 In support of their position, the claimants quote several human rights cases on excessive judicial delay and lack of judicial independence, citing case law from both the IACtHR and the ECtHR, which was in turn contested by the respondent State.
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A second ISDS case against Ecuador sought declaratory relief that Chevron was released from all environmental liability for Texaco's operations in Ecuador, being that country responsible for any remaining remediation work. The plaintiffs alleged that Ecuador breached investment agreements signed between 1994 and 1998, and that Ecuador had also breached the Ecuador-US BIT, including its obligation to afford national and most favored nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, non-arbitrary treatment, and generally nondiscriminatory treatment and the effective means of enforcing those rights. Russia contested the allegations of the claimants on the grounds that the measures taken against Yukos and its owners were based on their involvement in tax frauds, tax evasion and embezzlement, accusations which in turn were rejected by the claimants as being politically motivated. 99 The outcome of these cases provided the largest ever compensation in both ISDS and ECtHR systems.
A. The investment cases
With a view to obtaining compensation from the allegedly illegal measures described before, several cases were brought up by Yukos's shareholders against Russia, in different investment arbitral tribunals. 100 In 2005, a group of foreign-registered claimants initiated three parallel investor-state arbitration cases against Russia under the ECT, filed according to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, requesting a total compensation amounting to around USD 114 billion. 101 The same arbitrators were appointed in the three cases and rendered three parallel Awards on Merits on . 106 An arbitral tribunal ruled that Yukos' tax delinquency was "a pretext for seizing Yukos assets and transferring them to Rosneft", and awarded to the Spanish shareholders around USD 2 million plus interests. 107 Russia sought several ways of quashing this decision, and finally on 18 January 2016, a
Swedish appeals court issued a declaratory ruling finding that the arbitral tribunal wrongly took jurisdiction over the claims. A separate procedure is still pending in the Swedish courts to set aside the final award.
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B. The human rights cases
Before the ISDS cases by Yukos shareholders even started, it was the same company that on On 20 September 2011, the ECtHR issued a chamber judgment finding partially in favour of the claimants. The decision found that Yukos' rights to a fair trial and its property were violated due to the "arbitrariness and speed of tax debt enforcement proceedings conducted by Russian authorities, the unfairness of domestic proceedings challenging the tax assessments, and the retrospective application of fines for non-payment of taxes". 109 At the same time, the Court found that Russia did not misuse legal proceedings to destroy Yukos.
Complementing the previous decision, on 31 July 2014, in a chamber judgment, the ECtHR issued a decision on just satisfaction, 110 awarding its largest compensation to date, ordering Russia to pay around €1.9 billion to the shareholders of Yukos at the time of its liquidation, and to pay costs for €300,000. 111 On 15 December 2014, an ECtHR Grand Chamber panel of five judges decided to reject the referral request submitted by Russia, and now the decision is final. 112 This award is significantly lower than the ISDS arbitrations referred before, and only pecuniary damage was awarded, as the Court considered that, the findings of a violation of the ECHR, constituted sufficient just satisfaction for the company of non-pecuniary damage. 
C. Relationship between these investment and human rights cases
The Yukos cases are relevant for the analysis of the interplay between investment and human rights tribunals, not only because they both provide compensations under the same set of In fact, the Quasar de Valores award is explicitly critical of the approach taken by the ECtHR in the interpretation on a number of issues, notably by the rejection by the ECtHR of the argument that the Russian Tax Ministry knew of Yukos' tax "optimisation" arrangement. 119 Both tribunals have also a different take on the provisions regarding domestic tax haven, having the ECtHR the position that there was no fault with Russia's actions (finding the domestic law "vague"), while the ISDS arbitral tribunal found a violation of the applicable investment treaty. 120 Another point of disagreement was in the auction process of some of Yukos' assets, where the ECtHR had not been persuaded that Russia acted with an ulterior motive and the ISDS arbitral tribunal saw it as rigged to deliberately destroy Yukos. Finally, both tribunals had different evaluations of Russia's tax delinquency measures, as the ECtHR did not find "incontrovertible and direct proof" of an intended expropriation and the ISDS arbitral tribunal concluded that those measures went beyond its legitimate power of taxation, and amounted to expropriation. 121 The different take of both systems is also explained by the Quasar de Valores tribunal by the fact that foreign investors are not part of the community that benefits from a bona fide regulation in the public interest. Thus, investment protection treaties "might not allow a host state to place such a high individual burden on a foreign investor to contribute, without the payment of compensation, to the accomplishment of regulatory objectives for the benefit of a national community of which the investor is not a member". 122 The findings of the three ISDS arbitral panels established under the ECT also have several differences with the ECtHR, especially on the question of expropriation. These awards considered that the treatment that Russian subjected to Yukos and its key company officials amounted to an indirect appropriation, breaching Russia's obligations under Article 13 of the ECT. 123 In contrast to the findings of the ECtHR, the investment arbitral tribunals of the ECT cases specifically concluded that "the primary objective of the Russian Federation was not to collect taxes but rather to bankrupt Yukos and appropriate its valuable assets". 124 Substantial differences are also in the quantum of the compensation finally awarded, something that can be explained by the different bases for liability before the ECtHR and the arbitral tribunals and the Yukos ECT arbitral tribunals. Where the ECtHR decision was issued as a compensation for particular acts that caused interference with property rights, the arbitral tribunals awarded compensation for the expropriation of Yukos, in respect of the value of the company. 125 It is not necessarily surprising that the ECtHR and the ECT Tribunals reached different conclusions. Besides the different standards of proof and margin of appreciation that we have referred before, the process of adjudication was very different. While the Yukos ECT arbitral tribunals functioned much more like a full civil trial, including written evidence and crossexamined witnesses, the ECtHR proceedings were mostly based on written pleadings and little procedural testing of evidence.
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It is interesting to note that although the ECtHR is mindful of various parallel proceedings brought by some of the applicant company's shareholders against Russia in other international fora under BITs, both with final and pending awards, the ECtHR does not engage in a express discussion of their different approaches or merits, as the investment arbitral tribunals did. 127 The basis of this attitude is explained in the 2011 judgment of the ECtHR as a way "to avoid the situation where several international bodies would be simultaneously dealing with applications which are substantially the same". However, following a formalistic criterion, the same Court finally decided that the parties in the both proceedings are different and therefore the two matters are not "substantially the same".
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VI. Conclusion
The interaction between investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) and human rights courts has been under-researched. In a seminal work, Petersmann concluded that both ISDS and human rights regime share one fundamental communality: the development of legal rules and institutions to compensate the asymmetric legal relationship between individuals and sovereign states, enhancing the legal protection at international level of investors and individuals to compensate their inferior position vis-à-vis the State. 129 But, this commonality does not seem to be acknowledged by investment and human rights tribunals in Latin America.
While it is true that ISDS tribunals are generally reluctant to examine human rights arguments, either submitted directly by the parties or by non-parties via amicus curiae, 130 something similar happens at the IAHRS, which has not acknowledged the influence that Certain lessons could be learned from this interplay, especially in Latin America. Lixinski has analysed the issue of treaty interpretation by the IACtHR, and has found that the IAHRS has a more limited standing than most ISDS tribunals, as only investors who are natural persons affected are able to bring claims, mostly when it comes to the right to property, while companies are perceived as beyond human's right protection. 131 This is in stark contrast with the ECtHR, as it can be derived from the Yukos cases, where the same company was considered as the applicant.
The cautious approach of IACHR and the IACtHR in this regard may be explained because the IAHRS is not seen as the forum to protect business activities against arbitrary acts of the State. Although the IACtHR case law consider that property damage arises more from facts than from forms -which would tacitly imply the acceptance of the notions of "indirect" or "creeping" expropriation found in ISDS jurisprudence, the IACtHR has resisted mixing economic interests with human rights protection, even if property is in the centre of the dispute. 132 However, this does not mean that the ECtHR is a complete alternative to ISDS. As Kriebaum points out, the European Human Rights system has some "disadvantages" for the investors, as in principle, the ECtHR has the compulsory requirement to exhaust local remedies, and does not offer the same type of protection in case of expropriation, not granting indirect damages to shareholders, with the possibility of awarding less than full compensation in case of violation of the ECHR. 133 The same "shortcomings" are also valid for the Inter-American system.
Furthermore, human rights violations, cannot be excluded per se from the jurisdiction of ISDS tribunals, "if and to the extent that the human rights violation affects the investment, it becomes a dispute 'in respect of' the investment and is hence arbitrable". 134 However, the existing case law seems to limit the scope of the jurisdiction of ISDS tribunals to the subjectmatters explicitly included in the investment treaties. A claim brought on January 2016 by Al Jazeera against Egypt arose out of the alleged destruction of the claimant's media business in Egypt, by means of arrest and detention of employees, attacks on facilities, interference with transmissions and broadcasts, closure of offices, cancellation of claimant's broadcasting licence and compulsory liquidation of its local branch. 135 In a case brought against Yemen by a construction company, the arbitral tribunal awarded USD 1,000,000 as moral damages, after concluding that physical duress exerted on the executives of the claimant was malicious and constitutive of a fault-based liability. 136 In Biloune v. Ghana, a Syrian investor who managed the remodelling of a restaurant situated in Accra, was arrested and held in custody for 13 days, and eventually deported from Ghana to Togo, later claiming damages for expropriation, denial of justice and violation of human rights. The award held the Government of Ghana expropriated Mr. Biloune's interests and was under an obligation to compensate him, but decided that it had no jurisdiction over claims for denial of justice or violation of human rights, as an independent cause of action.
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On the other hand, compliance with the obligations derived from human rights instruments may serve as a context for the interpretation of the obligations of States with respect to foreign investors contained in IIAs. In a recent award in Urbaser v. Argentina, the arbitral tribunal developed an exhaustive analysis of the relationship between the human right to water and the protection of foreign investment, as a result of a counterclaim brought by Argentina against the investor. Although the counterclaim was ultimately rejected, the tribunal ruled that the BIT "has to be construed in harmony with other international law of which it forms part, including those relating to human rights." 138 Finally, there are several conclusions we can draw with respect of the "dual" role of the respondent State, in fulfilling its obligations under human rights and investment law regimes.
First, the relationship between foreign investment and protection of human rights entails a complex scenario for States that have to be respondent in two different forums defending interests that in most of the cases could be described as irreconcilable. For example, the
Chevron v. Ecuador case shows us the evident change in the position of the Ecuadorian State on oil drilling throughout time, from pro-investor to pro-communities stance. While in Renco v. Peru, the Peruvian State has lacked a response to its responsibility to extend the PAMA multiple times to the company Doe Run.
Second, there is also a potential use of litigation in foreign investment as a tool for defence in cases of human rights 139 or social and environmental damage, as it is especially evident in cases like Chevron and Renco. In both cases, the use of international investment arbitration by the companies has allowed them to avoid accountability for their operations in Latin America.
Consequently, compensation or remediation to the environment or communities affected by their operations in Ecuador and Peru is still pending.
Third, the existence of parallel claims both under human rights courts and investment tribunals, urges coordination for the respondent States both ex ante and ex post in both different fora.
